The RICO Enterprise and the Racketeering Actors
Joshua Paul Lintz
Accountability dossier

Joshua Paul Lintz

Former TopDevz COO (hired by Rajaee, 2020); later incorporated Talentcrowd.

Operational executor

Record-linked conduct

  • incorporated Talentcrowd (Feb. 8, 2022) as the laundering/operating vehicle — testified he did so "with the express authorization of Davis." ¶¶60,316
  • destroyed evidence — helped seize servers and "permanently deleted over 130 TopDevz client projects" from Jira on May 26, 2022. ¶¶291–296
  • received $722,335.83 in direct payments from the fraudulent Chase account. ¶62
Focused record proof

Documents naming, authorizing, contradicting, or materially affecting this role

No focused appendix or docket clip is currently mapped to this dossier. Use the full filing links and paragraph citations below.

Full filing proof

Complete documents tied to this dossier

Talentcrowd formation filing Talentcrowd: the cloned business JPMorgan statements (Ex. 83) Flow of funds: where the ~$15M went Payments to Lintz/Talentcrowd (Ex. 221) Flow of funds: where the ~$15M went
Pleaded predicate categories

Complaint categories that directly name this actor

States the Jan. 2022 mass download of a proprietary 2.5M-record database (3,784 files by one defendant; a full Zoho Recruit dump by another), corroborated by Google admin audit logs showing thousands of administrative actions. ¶¶501–504
States promotional and transactional laundering — wires from the fraudulent account to fund operations using stolen secrets, and >$10,000 transactions in criminally-derived funds to attorneys and others. ¶¶325–331
States the Jan. 15, 2022 destruction of computers/servers, the deletion of "over 130 TopDevz client projects," and deletion of evidence from the plaintiff’s email. ¶¶291–298
Scheme map

Where this role appears in the larger record

The heist: trade-secret theft A 2.5M-record database, 3,784 files, and a look-alike domain. ¶¶277–296 Talentcrowd: the cloned business Same clients, same database, new name — and the laundering wires. ¶¶316,322,329 Flow of funds: where the ~$15M went A money map from the seized accounts out to the cloned business and the lawyers. ¶¶325–331; ¶272 Obstruction & the inside mole Server destruction, deleted projects, and covert email access. ¶¶291–298 The successor problem: GBQ Buying the cloned business amid pending suits — and continuing to use the data. ¶¶432–438