The RICO Enterprise and the Racketeering Actors
Joshua Paul Lintz
Accountability dossier

Joshua Paul Lintz

Former TopDevz COO (hired by Rajaee, 2020); later incorporated Talentcrowd.

Operational executor
Narrated documentary | 10:34

Watch the narrated documentary

How TopDevz was taken from its founder, restarted as Talentcrowd, and cloaked in the legitimacy of civil courts.

Record-linked conduct

  • incorporated Talentcrowd (Feb. 8, 2022) as the laundering/operating vehicle — testified he did so "with the express authorization of Davis." ¶¶60,316
  • destroyed evidence — helped seize servers and "permanently deleted over 130 TopDevz client projects" from Jira on May 26, 2022. ¶¶291–296
  • received $722,335.83 in direct payments from the fraudulent Chase account. ¶62
Full filing proof

Complete documents tied to this dossier

Talentcrowd formation filing Talentcrowd: the cloned business JPMorgan statements (Ex. 83) Flow of funds: where the ~$15M went Payments to Lintz/Talentcrowd (Ex. 221) Flow of funds: where the ~$15M went
Pleaded predicate categories

Complaint categories that directly name this actor

States the Jan. 2022 mass download of a proprietary 2.5M-record database (3,784 files by one defendant; a full Zoho Recruit dump by another), corroborated by Google admin audit logs showing thousands of administrative actions. ¶¶501–504
States promotional and transactional laundering — wires from the fraudulent account to fund operations using stolen secrets, and >$10,000 transactions in criminally-derived funds to attorneys and others. ¶¶325–331
States the Jan. 15, 2022 destruction of computers/servers, the deletion of "over 130 TopDevz client projects," and deletion of evidence from the plaintiff’s email. ¶¶291–298
Scheme map

Where this role appears in the larger record

The heist: trade-secret theft A 2.5M-record database, 3,784 files, and a look-alike domain. ¶¶277–296 Talentcrowd: the cloned business Same clients, same database, new name — and the laundering wires. ¶¶316,322,329 Flow of funds: where the ~$15M went A money map from the seized accounts out to the cloned business and the lawyers. ¶¶325–331; ¶272 Obstruction & the inside mole Server destruction, deleted projects, and covert email access. ¶¶291–298 The successor problem: GBQ Buying the cloned business amid pending suits — and continuing to use the data. ¶¶432–438